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The Shield of America 
 
Michael Rustin 
 
 
Philip Bobbitt.  The Shield of Achilles:  War, Peace and the Course of History. 
London: Allen Lane/ Penguin 2002. 922 pages. £25.  
 
A shortened version of this review was published in The Political Quarterly, 
74, 3, July-September 2003 pp 409 - 412  
 
 
There is a strong tradition in the United States which connects academic 
writing in the field of international relations, with the development and practice 
of foreign policy, a lineage  in which George Kennan, Henry Kissinger and 
Zbigniew Brzezinski have been among the leading modern  figures.  Philip 
Bobbitt has advised both Democrat and Republican Administrations in recent 
times, and although he has not himself  been a great wielder of power, The 
Shield of Achilles belongs in this tradition. It speaks directly to its time.  ‘We 
are in a moment in world affair when the essential ideas that govern statecraft 
must change,’ is his opening sentence (p xxi). Threats to the  survival of 
states that formerly could come only from other states are now ubiquitous,  
‘owing to advances in international telecommunication, rapid computation, 
and weapons of mass destruction.’  The Shield of Achilles was written before 
the events of September 11 2001, but its argument anticipated such an 
attack, and scarcely needed to be changed  to take account of it.1 ‘If, some 
historians argue, the twentieth century began in August 1914 it may be that 
the twenty-first century will be said to have begun in September 2001.’  (p 
820).  The proximity of Bobbitt’s thesis to the position of the current Bush 
Administration is evident.  Arguments that it sets out in abstract terms (e.g.  
for the mobilisation of whatever  coalitions may be appropriate for 
                                            
1
 By contrast, the arguments of Hardt and Negri’s Empire (2000) were severely jolted by the 
September 11th events and their aftermath. An account of a new kind of ‘empire’, depending 
on international consensus and legality, based on what Hardt and Negri believed had been 
agreed norms necessary  to  interventions in the Balkans and in the Gulf War, have come up 
against  evidence that the Bush Administration was now imposing its power on the world in 
the manner of a more traditional empire. On Hardt and Negri’s book, see 'Empire: A 
Postmodern Theory of Revolution', New Political Economy Vol. 7, No. 3, 2002.   
 2
interventions against  specific threats, or describing  the impotence of the UN 
in face of threats to security) have since been put in blunt terms by senior 
figures in the George W. Bush government. Bobbitt has been an advocate of 
war on Iraq.  
 
However, while most of the world perceives President Bush’s stated view of 
the world as alarmingly  crude and simplistic, Bobbitt has written a remarkable   
treatise on the history of states and inter-state relations, in developing his 
view of this epochal transition from one international order to another.  Since 
so much of his analysis provides   theoretical underpinning for what the United 
States is now doing, and noting the references he makes to current  state 
papers,  we would be unwise to underestimate the George W. Bush 
administration’s strategic coherence.  Just as with President Reagan,  it 
seems that a populist and folksy leader who reveals not a glimmer of 
intellectual curiosity, can  in certain circumstances provide an effective front 
for a formidable deployment of  power.   
 
The Historical Origins of State Forms 
 
Bobbitt in the first half of his book (‘States of War’) sets out to explain the 
evolution of state forms by reference to the success or failure of states in war. 
‘Each epochal war’, he writes in summary,  ‘brought a particular constitutional 
order to primacy.'  'The peace treaties that end epochal wars ratify a particular 
constitutional order for the states.’  (P. 346).  The  historical sequence is 
outlined as princely state, kingly state, territorial state, state-nation, nation-
state, and market-state.  Thus the Thirty Years’ War established the 
supremacy of the kingly state, which was  ratified in the Treaty of Westphalia 
of 1648;  of the territorial state by the War of Louis IV, ratified in the Treaty of 
Utrecht of 1713; and of the state-nation by the Wars of the French Revolution, 
sealed  by the Treaty of Vienna of 1815.  
 
A crucial but contentious feature of Bobbitt's narrative is his explanation of the 
emergence and hegemony of the nation-state. Whilst a regulated international 
order of nation-states  was  formally ratified by the Treaty of Versailles in 
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1918, following wars  of national unification in Europe during the nineteenth 
century,  and the First World War, the intended settlement of nation-states 
failed.  Instead, a prolonged but intermittent  war took place, between 
democratic, fascist and communist states. Bobbitt defines 1914-1990 as the 
epoch of the Long War, which ended  with the  defeat of communism in 
Europe.  But  the settlement which was  ratified by the Peace of Paris in 1990 
is bringing  not the ruleful order of nation-states envisaged by Woodrow 
Wilson at Versailles (an approximation to the inter-state order of  ‘Perpetual 
Peace’ envisaged  by Kant in 1795), but instead the undermining of nation-
states and the rise of a new state form, the market-state,  in a world which is 
now dominated by the power of the United States. 'Mindful of the past, we can 
expect a new epochal war in which a new form of the State - the market-state, 
asserts its primacy....' (P. 815).  'The September attacks can be understood 
as the first battle in this new war,' he writes  in his postscript. (P. 820).    
 
The theory that underlies The Shield of Achilles, that success in war is the 
ultimate determinant of state forms, presupposes the necessity  of violence 
and conflict in human affairs.2 It has a Hobbesian (and Machiavellian) 
presupposition, that only the deployment of power can restrain 
aggrandisement, and thus maintain peace between men,  through  the threat 
or exercise of force by a sovereign power.  This principle explains and justifies 
the role of states in governing their subjects or citizens. It also explains how 
they conduct themselves in relation to other states,  in seeking  as much 
power over other states  as their means  will permit.   Even if states may not 
themselves be inherently aggressive, they are compelled to maximise their 
capacity to exercise violence if they are to avoid being subject to the 
aggressions of other states.  C.B. MacPherson’s The political theory of 
possessive individualism3 (Oxford University Press 1962)   pointed out how 
Hobbes’ ideas of innate inter-individual and inter-state conflict became 
foundations of competitive market economies.  Economic actors within 
                                            
2
 'The State is born in violence: only when it has achieved a legitimate monopoly on violence 
can it promulgate law; only when it is free of  the coercive violence of other states can it 
pursue strategy.' (P. 336).  
3
 C.B. MacPherson (1962) The political theory of possessive individualism: Hobbes to Locke. 
Oxford University Press.   
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capitalism, Marx and MacPherson noted, were forced to be aggressive if they 
were successfully to defend themselves  against the aggression  of others. 
Thus, in a world of competition between self-interested actors,  power and not 
morality is what counts.   
 
Bobbitt’s argument  takes account  of different forms of power, but largely in 
relation to how these contribute to the capacity of states to coerce each other.  
The evolution of state forms from the princely state to the nation-state was  
determined in his view  by the superior capacity of the later state forms  to 
organise  peoples and economic resources in the service of increasingly ‘total’ 
forms of war. Ideologies, such as nationalism, the ideal of  membership in a 
self-determining nation,  have been a mobilising resource  in establishing the 
competitive advantage of some state forms  over others,  during the French 
Revolutionary wars and afterwards.  A cause of  the collapse of empires, first 
the Ottoman, then the Austro-Hungarian, later the European colonial empires, 
was the mobilisation against them of nationalisms.  Although Bobbitt's central  
argument is that wars determine state forms, he seeks to avoid undue 
reductionism by  taking account of the many  factors which explain why 
different state forms have  prevailed in different epochs.4   
 
The Contemporary International Order 
 
The second half of The Shield of Achilles  (called ‘States of Peace’) is 
concerned with the problem of how peace and security are to be maintained 
in the twenty-first century.  Bobbitt’s view of this is based on two key 
assumptions. The first is the pre-eminence of United States military power,  
following its defeat of the Soviet system.  The second is that    the nation-state 
is becoming obsolete.  With its weakness is collapsing also the  rule-based 
international order which  it was hoped could be based on the emergence of 
self-determining nations. If this was not yet feasible in 1947, with the 
formation of the United Nations, because of the persistence of the colonial 
                                            
4
 There is not space to describe  this here,  but Bobbitt's  book is  exceptionally interesting in 
much of its  detail, for example in its references to classical jurisprudence, and in its accounts 
of diplomatic history (it has a remarkable defence of Castlereagh.)   
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empires and the divisions of the Cold War, one might have expected this 
would become possible after 1990.  But instead, Bobbitt argues, the nation-
state is being superseded by the market-state5, and a different international 
order is needed.6   
 
The decline of the nation state has several major aspects, in Bobbitt's  view.  
In the first place, it de-territorialises the means of violence. Threats that 
formerly came from boundaried territorial states, or from state systems such 
as the Soviet bloc, may in future come from anywhere, in the form of 
biological, nuclear, or 'cyber' attacks which will target  the informational 
networks of the world. Forms of deterrence which might be effective in face of 
threats from territorial states will not be  effective against dispersed  networks 
of terrorism.  In the second place, nations are becoming powerless to defend 
themselves, just as they have already become unable to guarantee the 
material living standard of their citizens. Instead of being guarantors of their 
citizens' well-being, states have to settle for the role of providing them with 
opportunities, that it is to say facilitating their involvement in the global market 
economy. Such a view is being put into practice in  New Labour's reforms of 
the welfare state.       
 
In a world where nation-states  are neither the principal  armed threat, nor 
capable of protecting themselves against such threats,  Bobbitt argues that 
different systems of defence are called for.  Providentially, the United States is 
at hand to make these possible. As the preponderant power,  it is alone  in a 
position to organise and implement  responses to the various global risks to 
security.   Bobbitt sets out  persuasive arguments for this hypothetical role of 
the USA as a power of last resort (chapters 26 and 27, especially page 803).    
Suppose, he says, there were a rogue state, or terror group, threatening the 
                                            
5
 Not wishing to oversimplify, Bobbitt argues that the market-state comes in three varieties, 
the entrepreneurial (USA), the managerial (EU) and the mercantile (Japanese).  He explains 
the necessary functions of these states in market societies.  
6
 Bobbitt argues, not quite in so many words, that the new constitutional order of market-
states needs its epochal war to bring it into being. ('We must establish a consensus....War 
provided the means by which consensus was established in the past. Peace resolves issues 
that war has defined, winnowed and presented in a way that is ripe for resolution.' P. 277). 
Iraq must  for him be the second battle in this epochal war.     
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world with ‘weapons of mass destruction’ – say a nuclear attack.  Whose 
responsibility would it be to respond to this threat? Would it really be 
reasonable, he asks, given recent experience of international division and 
inaction in the face of lesser threats (in the former Yugoslavia, for example) to  
wait for consensus to arrive,   or for the United Nations to achieve  a capacity 
and willingness to act? Surely in such circumstances the United States would 
be justified in taking action – even pre-emptively, he suggests – with whatever 
allies could be enlisted in support - or as Bush has called it in the current 
context,  with a ‘coalition of the willing.'  
 
One can  recognise the compelling  logic of this argument in an extreme 
circumstance, without agreeing that this should  be the defining logic of the 
entire international order. In a similar way, one might agree that Vietnam was 
justified in intervening in Cambodia in 1970 to halt the atrocities of the Pol Pot 
regime, without  proposing that nations are  in general entitled to act as 
belligerent humanitarian neighbours whenever they wish. Extreme situations 
may demand extreme remedies, but they do not thereby become norms for 
everyday.       
 
Although Bobbitt rightly draws attention to many tendencies which have been 
weakening the nation state’s power to determine its own existence, (or at 
least most nation states – the USA is the   significant  exception to the rule)   it 
is the nature and potential of armed force in the contemporary world  that is 
decisive for his  argument.  This follows from his general  view,  that it is the 
outcome  of wars that ultimately determines state forms and inter-state 
relations. It is  ultimately because  the military and associated power of the  
United States  finally resolved the ‘Long War’ of the twentieth century,  that it 
is now in a position to shape the next  historical epoch.  
 
Before accepting this proposition, however, one needs to look carefully at 
Bobbitt's analysis of the 'Long War'.  Should we  conceive this as one war,  or 
several, and if several, over what differences were they each fought?  Here 
we need to return to theory.  Bobbitt gives too much weight to war as the 
major determinant of the evolution of states. The historical sequence he 
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describes, from princely states as least as far forward as nation-states, is 
explained as much by the demands for  extended citizenship developed   over 
generations,   as  by the outcome of wars between states.7 His Hobbesian, 
‘realist’ view that states should be conceived as power-seeking entities 
ignores the specific natures of states and the competition between the 
different social systems that they rule.  At stake in the war with the fascist 
powers in the 1930s and 1940’s were opposed  conceptions of society.  
Similarly, in the contest between the capitalist and communist powers during 
this entire period,  conflicting conceptions of economy and polity were at 
issue.  These were wars not merely between states, but between social 
systems and their competing values.8   
 
The reason for the failure of the ideal of  international order proposed at 
Versailles was that the participant nations were either not  committed to a 
universal democratic order,  or  were unable to sustain democracy at home 
because of  their intractable social divisions.  The victorious European powers 
were rulers of empires, which they had no intention of giving up in favour of a 
universal principle of national self-rule. (It later took many anti-colonial wars to 
bring about a semblance of universal self-government.)  The principal 
defeated power had been ruined by its defeat, and by the vindictive  short-
sightedness of the victors. The Nazi regime which then emerged was 
committed to the imperial conquest  of Europe.  Soviet Russia was engaged 
from 1917 in a different and opposed trajectory of state-led modernisation.  
The period from 1918 to 1945 saw the near eclipse and defeat of the  
principles of national self-determination  and democracy set out by Woodrow 
Wilson at Versailles.9 
 
                                            
7
 One of Bobbitt's purposes is to 'revise the widespread assumption that economics and 
sociological conflict are the basis for all historical phenomena.' (P. 336)  
8
 Justin Rosenberg's (1994) The Empire of Civil Society  Verso,  is a valuable critique of 
'realist' theories of international relations, arguing that they neglect the attributes of social 
systems that determine what states are and how they relate to each other.  Bobbitt does take 
account of differences between modern social systems, describing a contest between the 
Anglo-Saxon, Asian and Continental European models of capitalism, but these differences 
have a subordinate place in his analysis.  
9
 Woodrow Wilson and his adviser Colonel House, characterised to good effect  in this book,  
are the 'idealist' antithesis of Bobbitt's 'realist' position.  
 8
 
In the period after 1945, another and better attempt was made to construct an 
international order based on Kantian principles of ‘perpetual peace’.  
Democracy was strengthened by the defeat of the fascists, and in both 
Europe and America political power was deployed to constrain and regulate 
the markets whose ravages had contributed to destroy the 1918 settlement.  
The dominant nation states after 1945  sought  to protect their citizens from 
economic risk and uncertainty, and to create the condition for advances in 
their  standards of life.  (Ernest Gellner10 and Zigmunt Bauman11 have pointed 
out that this was part of the  raison d'être for  nation states.)  The ‘post-
national’ forms of shared sovereignty that we see emerging in many 
international institutions and agreements, and in a system of partially pooled 
sovereignty such as the European Union, have taken these democratic 
purposes and sought to implement them in a more exposed global 
environment.12 
 
The question is, why is a moment which might have seen the post-imperial 
triumph of national self-determination and democracy,  and a peaceful 
international order where there are few enemies left,  instead interpreted  by 
Bobbitt as a  decisive moment of failure of the nation-state and the United 
Nations? (Bobbitt has little regard for representative democracy, at either 
national or international level, preferring the choices made through markets.13   
Must we now be content with the protection of Bobbitt's 'Shield of Achilles' ,  
or do other possibilities remain  open? Is Bobbitt, as he may  see himself,  an 
objective analyst of the inescapable realities of modern power, outlining the 
least-bad forms of collective security available?  Or is he rather the  advocate 
                                            
10
 E. Gellner (1964) Thought and Change. Weidenfeld and Nicolson; E. Gellner (1983)  
Nations and Nationalism. Blackwell.   
11
 Z. Bauman (2002) Society under Siege. Polity.  
12
 These developments towards  'cosmopolitan democracy' have been described by David 
Held and Anthony McGrew (2002)  Globalisation/Anti-Globalisation.  Polity, and in several 
other works.     
13
 When the United Nations has a 'constitution for a society of market states,' Bobbitt writes' 
...' it will resemble those of corporations, which have weighted voting by wealth.'  (P. 301) .He 
writes off most of the international institutions of the post-1945 period, including the European 
Union, as irrelevant to the world of market states. (on P. 776).    
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of a form of quasi-imperial dominion, whose instrument is the market-state  
and  to which there are and should be alternatives?   
 
The answer to this question depends on the view one takes of globalisation, 
of which this  book provides  a sweeping  account  from a strategic and 
constitutional perspective. 14  He regards  the market as an unstoppable and 
indeed benign driver of change, rather than as a contested system of 
organisation, whose  domination is in part the effect of the ideology and  
action  of  governments in the United States and elsewhere  from the 1980s 
till now.  From this has followed  the undermining  of nation-states  in favour of 
the market-state, which ....' offers a different covenant: it will maximise the 
opportunity of its people.' (P. xxvi).  All is inevitability,  given the premise that 
markets are the main engine of transformation. 15    For Bobbitt, threats to 
security, which demand a new constitutional order capable of engaging in  'a 
series of low-intensity conflicts', will come from those unavoidably disaffected 
by this system,  and by the growing weakness of the existing  constitutional 
order of states.   He does not see these threats as the outcome of the 
systemic breakdown of social cohesion which global markets bring about.  
However, systems which 'maximise opportunities' for some, also maximise 
risk and damage for many others.  Their ideology of individualisation produces 
both amoral ruthlessness, and, as Castells  pointed out16, retreats to 
fundamentalist enclaves of meaning and antagonism.     
 
Bobbitt addresses the symptoms of this situation, through the new system of 
global security of which the invasion of Iraq is another deliberate trial,  but 
leaves its deeper causes unchallenged.  His  argument is driven by anxiety 
about de-territorialised threats of force  - September 11  before it even 
happened, and the threats from 'weapons of mass destruction' which are the 
                                            
14
 There are many similarities between his model of globalisation, and that of social scientists 
from other disciplines such as Giddens (cited by him) and Castells, though he writes  from the 
perspective of   international  order.      
15
 Historicism is no longer the prerogative of Marxists. (...'we  can shape the next epochal war 
if we appreciate its inevitability and also the different forms it may take.'  P. xxiv). 
Globalisation theory, as Megnad Desai has pointed out  adopts  Marx's theory of economic 
transformation,  whilst taking global capitalism to be its destination. (M. Desai, (2001) Marx's 
Revenge. Verso).  
16
 Manuel Castells, (1998)  End of Millennium. Blackwell.   
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reason or pretext for the Iraq war.17  He does not sufficiently question  these 
risks, partly because he holds to an a  priori Hobbesian theory that actors will 
always use the  powers that they have in their own interest,  and because 
modern technologies  have created new  destructive means.   But this  theory 
addresses only a part  of reality,  and Bobbitt  exaggerates the dangers.  (It 
does not seem probable  that terrorist attacks will exact the scale of damage 
of wars.) Why should we not look to the alleviation of the material miseries 
and the disrespecting of lives  which generate hatred and violence, and seek 
to remedy those through the exercise of democratic sovereignty,   rather than 
devote such excessive  emphasis  to meeting force with force?  The 
amplification of terrorist threats can indeed be self-fulfilling, and for certain 
forms of power, self-serving, since it justifies the primacy of coercion in the 
conduct of affairs.  It may  lead us in fact to the security  state,  always primed 
for war.   
 
Kant's doctrine of perpetual peace presupposed  a human nature which was 
capable of  moral behaviour, an idea of humanity among which respect for 
others was as natural as hatred of them. The pax americana (or imperium) 
implicitly theorised in Philip Bobbitt's book has little use for such benign 
beliefs, but we diminish  them at our peril.    
 
 
 
  
 
                                            
17
 For Bobbitt wars seem to be so historically necessary that they are almost welcome. The 
fine aesthetic qualities of the book - its title drawn from the Iliad, counterpointed by Auden's 
great  poem and others critical of war,  are disquieting considering that this is its position.   
